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506 Abstract
During the last decade, Greece faced one of the most severe debt crises among 
developed countries, leading to Economic Adjustment Programs in order to avoid 
a disorderly default. Public expenditure was cut, tax rates were increased and new 
taxes were introduced, aiming at restoring public finances. Prominent among the 
latter were recurrent property taxes that had played a very minor role before the 
crisis. These taxes helped to boost public revenues but were hugely unpopular. 
The paper examines in detail their distributional impact and finds that they led to 
increases in inequality and (relative) poverty. The result is stronger in the case of 
inequality indices that are relatively more sensitive to changes close to the bottom 
of the distribution and poverty indices that are sensitive to the distribution of 
income among the poor.
Keywords: property taxation, inequality, poverty, progressivity, Greece
1 INTRODUCTION 
During the 1995-2007 period Greece’s average growth rate was 3.9% per annum; 
second only to Ireland among the Eurozone countries and 1.5% above the Euro-
zone mean. However, Greece’s growth model was based primarily on the expan-
sion of consumption and was largely financed by the inflow of external funds. 
Even though Greek banks were not directly exposed to American subprime bonds, 
when the economic recession following the Lehman Brothers collapse erupted, 
the deficiencies of this model became apparent. In 2008 output stagnated and in 
2009 the economy moved into full recession. Internal and external imbalances 
that had been growing steadily in earlier years deteriorated and the economy faced 
enormous “twin deficits” (in the general government budget and the current 
account); the deficit in the current account exceeded 15% of GDP in 2008 and the 
budget deficit was over 15% in 2009. In 2010 Greece was cut off from the inter-
national capital markets and in order to avoid a disorderly default had to rely on 
the help of her Eurozone partners and the IMF, through three Economic Adjust-
ment Programs that lasted for eight years (2010-2018).1
In the framework of these programs, Greece agreed to rebalance its public finances 
through both expenditure cuts and tax increases. As shown in Graph 1, before the 
Economic Adjustment Programs Greece’s share of taxes in GDP fluctuated around 
33%, far below the EU average (close to 39%). In the years of the Economic Adjust-
ment Programs Greece’s share of taxes in GDP rose rapidly and stabilized above the 
EU average, close to 41%. During this period, almost all tax rates were increased, 
while new taxes were introduced. As a result, the share of all types of taxes in GDP 
(direct taxes, indirect taxes, social insurance contributions and property taxes) rose, 
as shown in Graph 2. Regarding property taxes, although their share in GDP is 
small, it rose markedly after the introduction of a new property tax in 2011.






















































































44 (4) 505-528 (2020)
507graph 1























2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Income taxes SICs Consumption taxes Property taxes
Source: Eurostat (2018).
As Mirrlees et al. (2011:368) point out “Most taxes nowadays are levied on flows 
of income and of expenditure. But land and property have been taxed for centuries 
– certainly for longer than income – and they continue to form an important part 
of the tax base in most advanced economies”. Property taxation and especially, the 
taxation of land, has been popular among economists mainly on efficiency 
grounds. Following Ramsey (1927), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) show that this 
type of taxation causes far fewer distortions than other types of taxes, particularly 
since it affects labour supply decisions minimally and hence, ceteris paribus, can 





















































































44 (4) 505-528 (2020)
508 immovable nature of real estate, property taxation is usually associated with high 
rates of collectability, making it popular among policy makers (Cabral and Hoxby, 
2012).2
However, in most cases property taxes are hugely unpopular among the members 
of the general population (Norregaard, 2013). Mirrlees et al. (2011) conjecture 
that this unpopularity may be due to the fact that in most countries income and 
consumption taxes are withheld at source and remitted to the government by firms 
for the majority of the population. Therefore, property taxes may be the only or 
the largest taxes that are paid directly by taxpayers and are not withheld at any 
stage. Further, there is evidence that a considerable proportion of the population 
think that it is unfair to tax housing property (Lyons, 2007) particularly since, at 
least in the short run, these taxes are independent of someone’s current income 
and, hence, ability to pay (Slack and Bird, 2014). This unpopularity may be miti-
gated in cases where property taxes are local taxes and are somehow considered 
“service charges” to the local community, thus collectively increasing local prop-
erty values (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989).
The expected distributional incidence of property taxes depends on the tax base 
(primary residence only, all housing, industrial buildings, agricultural land, other 
land types, etc.), the tax rates applied both within and across types of real estate as 
well as the tax relief measures applied.  In general, it was expected that since 
property is a form of capital and capital is more concentrated than income, the 
redistributive effects of property taxation should be progressive (Aaron, 1974). 
However, empirical studies in several countries show that usually property taxes 
constitute a higher fraction of the income of lower rather than higher income 
deciles3, thus increasing rather than reducing inequality; see, for example, the 
results of Kim and Lambert (2009), Davis et al. (2009) and Joumard, Pisu and 
Bloch (2012) for the United States, Chawla and Wannell (2003) and Palameta and 
Macredie (2005) for Canada and Joumard, Pisu and Bloch (2012) for the United 
Kingdom. On the opposite side, Marical (2009) reports that, due to a number of 
generous income- and family-related tax reliefs, recurrent taxes on immovable 
property in France are marginally progressive. In the case of Greece, although the 
contribution of these taxes to the stabilization effort of the economy was signifi-
cant, their distributional effects have not yet been investigated. The present 
research aims to fill this gap.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description 
of property taxation in Greece in a comparative perspective vis-à-vis other EU coun-
tries. Section 3 presents the data and methods used in the empirical analysis. Section 
4 contains the empirical results on the distributional effects of recurrent immovable 
property taxation in Greece. Section 5 provides the conclusions.
2 Moreover, property taxes can also be used as policy tools in order to manage urban density, land use and 
housing market prices as well as speculation and “bubbles” in real estate and, thus, economic cycles.
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5092 IMMOVABLE PROPERTY TAXATION IN GREECE
Traditionally, immovable property taxation in Greece relied on non-recurrent 
taxes (taxes on transactions, inheritances and in-vivo transfers of immovable prop-
erty). Usually, such taxes accounted for around 0.4%-0.5% of GDP. Before the 
2000s, several attempts to introduce recurrent property taxation were unsuccess-
ful mainly due to lack of property valuations. In the 2000s, with a proper valuation 
system in place covering most parts of the country, a number of attempts to intro-
duce such taxes under various schemes took place, the most important of which 
were: the Unified Real Estate Duty (ETAK), the Tax on Large Real Estates 
(FMAP) and the Municipal Real Estate Duty (TAP). Nevertheless, as shown in 
Graph 3, the revenues raised from these schemes remained very low (between 
0.1% and 0.2% of GDP).
graph 3
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Total Recurrent Non-recurrent 
Source: Hellenic Ministry of Finance, General Accounting Office and AMECO (2020).
The picture changed dramatically during the crisis, due to the urgent need to 
increase revenues. In 2011, the Emergency Special Duty of Buildings Connected 
to the Electricity Grid (EETHDE) was introduced. The tax was applied only to 
buildings, both private households and firms being eligible for payments and, in 
order to achieve a high collection rate, it was collected through electricity bills.4 
In 2014, the Unified Real Estate Property Tax (ENFIA) replaced EETHDE and 
was extended to the possession of land. On top of this, a supplementary tax was 
introduced for individuals with a total taxable property value of over 200,000 
euros (covering the top 8% of the distribution of natural persons); it was aimed at 
introducing some progressivity into the scheme. Moreover, reduced rates applied 
to some of the most vulnerable population groups. Since 2014, changes in the 
4 The tax was introduced in late 2011 and the tax bill could be paid in installments. Most units eligible to the 
tax paid part of it in 2011 and part in 2012. For this reason, in Graph 3 only part of the effect of the introduc-
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510 level of tax have taken place mainly in order to introduce further tax deductions 
for vulnerable groups and gradual deleverage with successive horizontal tax rate 
deductions in the most recent years.
As shown in Graph 3, after the introduction of EETHDE and, especially, ENFIA, 
the share of recurrent immovable property taxes in national income shot up, reach-
ing 2.0% of GDP. Collection rates were high. For example, according to the Gen-
eral Accounting Office data for 2018, the collection rate of ENFIA was 84%.5 At 
the same time, due to the crisis, real estate transactions declined sharply leading to 
a fall in non-recurrent property tax revenues as a share of GDP and recurrent taxes 
accounted for the lion’s share of property taxes.
The recurrent taxes introduced in the period under consideration were assessed at 
the individual level and the tax base for the calculation of the tax was the taxable 
value of each asset. This, in turn, was determined mainly by the (administratively 
assessed) value of the geographical zone of the real estate asset. A major problem 
with the assessment of these taxes was that during the crisis property market val-
ues declined by over 40% (Bank of Greece, 2019: Table II.6), while their taxable 
values remained unchanged. The problem was further complicated because 
Greece lacks a complete cadastral registry and the re-assessment of detailed tax-
able values would have been a very hard exercise given the low number of trans-
actions in the real estate market during the crisis. This is a usual drawback of real 
estate taxes in practice in many countries. As Almy (2014) points out, valuation 
practices frequently ignore revaluation requirements, which almost by definition 
occur in periods of rapid recession or growth. This lack of revaluation can enhance 
the perception of taxpayers that property taxes may be unfair. It should be noted 
that these taxes were introduced close to the peak of the Greek crisis. Output was 
down by 26%, the rate of unemployment was above 27%, while the disposable 
income of the average household was 42% below its peak (Andriopoulou et al., 
2018). Unsurprisingly, the new tax was hugely unpopular and, according to many 
commentators, contributed to the downfall of the then government in the 2015 
elections.
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EU28 total EU28 recurrent Greece total Greece recurrent 
Source: Eurostat (2020).
Graphs 4 and 5 compare Greece with other EU countries with respect to revenues 
collected through property taxation.6 Graph 4 shows that until 2010 Greece was 
lagging behind the European average in terms of the share of property taxes in 
GDP. The gap can be attributed exclusively to the difference in the share of taxes 
collected through recurrent taxes. After 2010, though, the picture changes com-
pletely. Due to the introduction of EETHDE and, then, ENFIA, the share of both 
recurrent and total property taxes in Greece’s GDP exceed the European average 
by a wide margin; in the last year under consideration in Graph 4, the differences 
are 1.1% and 0.6% of GDP, respectively.
6 These graphs refer to property taxation in general; not only immovable property taxation. However, in all 
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Recurrent property taxes Other property taxes
Source: European Commission, Taxation Trends (2019).
Graph 5 shows that in 2017 Greece’s share of property taxes in GDP was the fourth 
highest in the EU (behind France, the UK and Belgium), while in terms of the share 
of recurrent property taxes in GDP, only two countries were collecting higher reve-
nues than Greece (France and the United Kingdom). Furthermore, Greece’s share of 
property taxes in total taxes collected (8%) is substantially higher than the corre-
sponding mean EU figure (6%) (European Commission, 2019).
graph 6
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Greece AROP EU AROP Greece Gini EU Gini
Source: Eurostat (2020).
Finally, before moving to the empirical results, a few words on changes in ine-
quality and poverty in Greece during the period under consideration are needed. 
Despite the dramatic changes in living standards of the Greek population during 
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513index and the poverty rate when the poverty line is set at 60% of the median equiv-
alized income of the contemporaneous distribution suggest that the changes in 
inequality and poverty were not that large. Both of the indices remained substan-
tially higher than the EU averages in Greece during this period, rose in the early 
years of the Economic Adjustment Programs following the sharp increase in 
unemployment rate and declined in later years. Nevertheless, detailed analysis 
using inequality indices that are more sensitive than the Gini index to changes 
close to the tails of the income distribution (especially the bottom end of the dis-
tribution) and poverty indices that are sensitive to the depth of poverty as well as 
the distribution of income among the poor in Andriopoulou, Karakitsios and Tsak-
loglou (2018) and Andriopoulou, Kanavitsa and Tsakloglou (2020) records 
stronger changes in inequality - although the pattern is similar to that of Graph 6 
- and very considerable rises in poverty using “floating” and, especially, “anchored” 
poverty lines. Interestingly, unlike what is often heard in the Greek public dis-
course, the elderly improved their relative position while there was substantial 
deterioration in the relative position of the enlarged group of the unemployed, 
who swelled the ranks of the poor.
3 DATA AND METHODS
The data used in the paper are drawn from the Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (SILC) for Greece. We use SILC waves 2007 to 2017, corresponding 
to income years 2006 to 2016. The data set contains information on property taxes 
paid. The information appears to be very reliable.  For example, in 2017 the sum 
of recurrent property taxes reported in SILC was 2.3 billion euro, while the total 
reported by the tax authorities was 2.7 billion euro. However, the latter figure also 
includes recurrent property taxes paid by firms as well as households.
Due to the complexity of income surveys, such income data only become available 
with a considerable delay. For instance, the EU-SILC 2020 survey data (reporting 
incomes earned in 2019) will not be released before 2022. Tax-benefit microsimula-
tion models can fill this gap, providing timely estimates of the effects of changes in 
taxes and benefits on the income distribution (Figari, Paulus and Sutherland, 2015). 
In order to assess the distributional impact of changes in property taxation in the 
most recent years (i.e. 2017, 2018 and 2019) we make use of the Greek component 
of EUROMOD, the tax-benefit microsimulation model of the EU.
EUROMOD is a tool that enables researchers to estimate in a comparable way the 
effects of taxes and benefits on the income distribution. The model simulates per-
sonal tax and social insurance contribution liabilities as well as cash benefit enti-
tlements for all EU countries based on the national tax-benefit policy rules of a 
given year and the information available in the underlying microdata. The compo-
nents of the tax-benefit systems that cannot be simulated are taken directly from 
the data, along with information on original incomes. EUROMOD has been vali-
dated at both micro and macro level and has been extensively used to address a 
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514 2013). One of the most important advantages of EUROMOD is attribution; the 
model allows researchers to isolate the effects of each policy, taking into account 
the complex ways in which policies interact with each other.
In this paper, EUROMOD’s underlying microdata are drawn from SILC 2017. 
Updating incomes and non-simulated benefits from 2017 to 2019 is carried out 
using factors based on available administrative or survey statistics. Specific updat-
ing factors are derived for each income source, reflecting statutory rules or the 
change in the average amount per recipient between the income data reference 
period and the target year. In order to enhance the credibility of our estimates, an 
effort has been made to address issues such as tax evasion and benefit non-take-
up.7 It should be noted that the estimates of inequality, poverty and progressivity 
indices reported below with the use of EUROMOD are not strictly comparable 
with the estimates derived from SILC data. The differences in the simulated 
results and the results derived from SILC can be attributed primarily to the simu-
lation of several benefits in EUROMOD that are severely under-reported in SILC 
data (Tammik, 2019). When these corrections are made in EUROMOD, the 
incomes of a number of poor households rise and the corresponding estimates of 
inequality and poverty indices are lower than those derived from SILC. Therefore, 
these estimates are shown primarily in order to identify trends in recent years for 
which SILC data are not available.
For the period 2017-2019, the applicable property tax is ENFIA. As noted earlier, 
it consists of two parts: the primary and the supplementary. The primary tax is 
computed with an elaborate formula that, amongst other parameters, takes account 
of the cadastral value of the property, its surface, use and age as well as the floor 
on which it is located. There is also a social provision that grants discounts of 50% 
or 100% on the tax assessed to taxpayers with low family income, families of 3 or 
more dependent children, or with members suffering serious disabilities. The sup-
plementary tax is applicable for taxpayers with properties whose cadastral values 
exceed €200,000. The value of ENFIA is reported in SILC. However, since SILC 
provides no information on properties’ cadastral values, the policy is switched off 
in the baseline and the tax for 2017-2018 is taken directly from the input data 
(only minor changes were implemented in these years). However, in 2019 ENFIA 
was reduced by 10%-30% depending on the cadastral value of the property.8 This 
reduction is simulated in EUROMOD. In order to approximate properties’ values, 
we used the average cadastral values for urban and rural/semi-rural areas accord-
ing to tax data provided by the Greek authorities (i.e. €1,338 per square meter for 
those residing in urban areas and €745 per square meter for those residing in rural/ 
semi-rural areas).
7 Detailed information about each of these issues as well as validations against external sources are available 
in the EUROMOD Country Reports for Greece.
8 By 30% when the total cadastral value of the properties was below 60,000 euros, by 27% if it was between 
60,000 and 70,000, by 25% if it was between 70,000 and 80,000, 20% if it was between 80,000 and 1,000,000 
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515For the calculation of inequality, poverty and progressivity indices as well as for 
the classification of the members of the population in particular decile groups we 
used the member’s equivalized household disposable income.  This is the sum of 
all incomes of all household members net of income taxes and social insurance 
contributions (and, when needed, property taxes) divided by the household equiv-
alence scale.  The latter is used by EUROSTAT, which assigns 1 to the household 




Recurrent property taxes per capita per year, in euro, (lhs) and as share of dispos-

















2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Property taxes per capita Property taxes as share of disposable income 
Source: ELSTAT, SILC (2007-2017) and EUROMOD.
Recurrent immovable property taxes per capita over time are shown in Graph 7 
along with their share in household disposable income. For the first years of the 
period under examination, the recurrent property taxes in per capita terms are 
close to zero, while the introduction of ETAK in 2009 led to marginal increases. 
However, the introduction of EETHDE in 2011 increased sharply the amount of 
tax individuals paid from €15 on average in 2010 to €175 in 2012. Two years later, 
when EETHDE was replaced by ENFIA, the corresponding figure rose further, 
reaching a maximum of €225 in 2015. Since then, property taxes per capita 
started to decline due to reductions of cadastral values in many areas across the 
country and the introduction of tax exceptions for a number of vulnerable popula-
tion groups. A similar picture emerges for the share of recurrent property taxes in 
total household disposable income (gross of recurrent property taxes). Starting 
from close to 0% in 2006, households had to pay a bit less than 4% of their dispos-
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Source: ELSTAT, SILC (2008).
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Source: ELSTAT, SILC (2013).
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517Graphs 8i, 8ii and 8iii depict the level of recurrent property taxes per capita for 
each decile, when the population members are ranked from the poorest to the rich-
est. For the sake of brevity, we present estimates for three years out of the whole 
period under examination. These years are 2007, 2012 and 2016 and are repre-
sentative of the pre-crisis years and the years of the “maturity” of EETHDE and 
ENFIA, respectively.
For the majority of the population these taxes were zero in 2007. Even for the 
richest decile, the annual figure per capita was below 15 euro. On the contrary, in 
2012 and 2016 all deciles paid substantial amounts and the mean payment per 
decile rose continuously when moving from the poorest to the richest decile (with 
minor exceptions between the fifth and the sixth decile in 2012 and second and the 
third decile in 2016). Mean per capita payments ranged between 84 (113) euro for 
the bottom decile to 361 (420) euro for the top decile in 2012 (2016).
Prima facie, the evidence of Graphs 8i, 8ii and 8iii could imply that the redis-
tributive effect of the tax is progressive. However, to validate such a statement, we 
have to look at the tax as a share of distribution of disposable income per decile 
including the property tax (pre-tax distribution). The corresponding evidence is 
reported in Graphs 9i, 9ii and 9iii. The picture that emerges is anything but pro-
gressive, at least for 2012 and 2016. As expected, in 2007 the shares for all deciles 
are close to zero. In 2012, the share of the tax in the income of the bottom decile 
is 6.8%, declining almost progressively up to the top decile where it is 2.3%. The 
corresponding shares for 2016 are even higher; 8.5% and 2.9%, respectively. To 
some extent, these results may be attributed to the fact that during the crisis a 
number of property-owning households became jobless, while long-term unem-
ployment soared. Unemployment protection in Greece is quite inadequate, for the 
long-term unemployed it is almost non-existent, while in the years under consid-
eration there was no benefit of last resort in the form a minimum income guaran-
tee scheme. Hence, many households in the bottom decile had very limited mon-
etary resources while the taxable value of their real estate assets was not so low 
and, as a result, the decile ratio of taxes to disposable income was high. All in all, 
the evidence of these graphs provides a very strong indication that the incidence 
of the recurrent property taxes introduced during the crisis was regressive.9
9 This statement is in line with the vast majority of similar studies treating inequality and progressivity in rel-
ative terms. However, there is a strand of literature in which inequality and progressivity remain unchanged if 
the incomes of all population members change by the same amount (instead of the same proportion), (Black-
orby and Donaldson, 1980; 1984). Using this approach, the evidence provided so far would point to the oppo-
site direction, i.e. progressivity, since in absolute terms the property taxes paid by the rich are larger than 
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Source: ELSTAT, SILC (2008).
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Source: ELSTAT, SILC (2013).
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Lorenz and concentration curve, 2007
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Source: ELSTAT, SILC (2008).
graph 10ii
Lorenz and concentration curve, 2012
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Source: ELSTAT, SILC (2013).
graph 10iii
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520 Graphs 10i, 10ii and 10iii go a step further and show the Lorenz curves of the distri-
bution of pre-tax equivalized income and the concentration curves of recurrent 
property taxes for the three years under consideration. The grey area around the 
concentration curves is the 5% confidence interval for the corresponding points of 
the curves. In general, since tax is a negative income component, if the tax concen-
tration curve lies above (below) the Lorenz curve of the pre-tax income distribution, 
the Lorenz curve of the post-tax income distribution is likely to lie below (above) 
the pre-tax Lorenz curve. Some interesting observations can be made. In 2007 the 
concentration curve lies below the Lorenz curve, implying that the property taxes of 
that year were progressive (the top 5% of the distribution paid almost 40% of the, 
admittedly very low, total amount of the tax). However, the wide band of the confi-
dence interval implies that safe conclusions are hard to draw. On the contrary, in 
both 2012 and 2016 the concentration curves lie above the Lorenz curve and the 
confidence intervals are pretty narrow. This is another indication that the post-tax 
distribution of income is likely to be more unequal than the pre-tax distribution.
graph 11
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Source: ELSTAT, SILC (2007-2017) and EUROMOD.
Graph 11 depicts progressivity indices for all the years under examination. Esti-
mates for the 2006-2016 period are derived directly from SILC data, while 
EUROMOD-based estimates are provided for the years 2016-2019. Naturally, the 
simulated estimates of EUROMOD do not coincide with those observed in the 
sample in 2016, but the differences are pretty low. Estimates of two indices of 
progressivity (and redistribution) are shown in the graph. The first is the index of 
Kakwani (1977), which essentially measures departures from proportionality and 
takes values between -1 and 1; the larger the value of the index is, the more pro-
gressive is the social intervention. However, this index is not affected by the size 
of the corresponding transfer (Enami, Lustig and Aranda, 2017). Estimates of the 
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521of Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) which, essentially, measures the difference 
between the Gini coefficient of the pre-tax income distribution and the Gini coef-
ficient of the post-tax income distribution. It also takes values between -1 and 1 
and the larger its value, the higher the progressivity of the social intervention. 
Unlike the former index, this one is sensitive to the size of the transfer. The index 
of Kakwani has a rather erratic pattern until 2010 but, in general, classifies the 
redistributive effects of the property taxes in the early years as progressive. On the 
contrary, the Reynolds-Smolensky index for the same period is always very close 
to zero, implying that the impact of the tax on measured inequality was negligible. 
For the period after the introduction of EETHDE and ENFIA, both indices move 
to negative territory, implying that the property tax reforms of that period were 
regressive. It is interesting to note that in the final year under consideration, when 
proportional cuts to ENFIA were introduced, the Kakwani index hardly moves 
while the Reynolds-Smolensky index records a decline in regressivity (the esti-
mated value of the index increases from -0.047 to -0.033).
graph 12









2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Gini index EM: Gini index ATK (0.25) EM: ATK (0.25)
ATK (0.5) EM: ATK (0.5) ATK (0.75) EM: ATK (0.75)
Source: ELSTAT, SILC (2007-2017) and EUROMOD.
Inequality indices were calculated both for the distribution of disposable income 
including property taxes (pre-tax distribution) and for the distribution of disposa-
ble income net of property taxes (post-tax distribution). The corresponding pro-
portional changes in the estimates of the inequality indices due to recurrent 
immovable property taxes for each year are depicted in Graph 12. For the pur-
poses of the graph, we use the Gini index and three members of the parametric 
family of Atkinson (1970) indices. In comparison to other indices of inequality, 
the Gini index is relatively more sensitive to changes close to the middle of the 
income distribution (Cowell, 2000). In the case of the Atkinson index, the inequal-





















































































44 (4) 505-528 (2020)
522 the higher the value of the inequality-aversion parameter, the more sensitive the 
index is to changes close to the bottom of the distribution. The evidence of Graph 
12 shows that the effect of property taxation on the distribution of disposable 
income for the period 2006-2010 was very close to zero. In the following years the 
effect is negative and, in fact, the changes in inequality indices become increas-
ingly larger between 2010 and 2015. In 2016 the impact is again inequality-
increasing, but the effect is smaller than that of 2015. The change in the value of 
the Gini index as a result of the immovable property tax reforms (1.6% at the 
maximum) is smaller than the increase recorded in the Atkinson indices (between 
4.6% and 5.8% at the peak). It is worth noting that the higher the inequality-
aversion parameter of the Atkinson index the larger the proportional change in the 
value of the index. The changes in the estimates of inequality indices recorded 
using EUROMOD for 2016 are smaller than those recorded in the original SILC 
data, but the relative ranking of the indices remains the same. According to the 
evidence of Graph 12, for the period 2016-2019, the impact of recurrent property 
taxation remained regressive, but the changes introduced is these years moderated 
its inequality-increasing impact.
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Source: ELSTAT, SILC (2007-2017) and EUROMOD.
Finally, the effects of these taxes on relative poverty are assessed in Graph 13. For 
the purposes of this graph, the poverty line is not held constant but is always set at 
60% of the median income of the corresponding income distribution. Three mem-
bers of the parametric Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) (FGT) family of poverty 
indices are exploited for the purposes of this graph: the headcount ratio, FGT(0), 
which measures the proportion of the population falling below the poverty line, but 
is not sensitive to the severity of their poverty; FGT(1), which is the product of the 
headcount ratio and the average poverty gap (distance between the poverty line and 
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523measures the product of the head count ratio by the squared poverty gap and, thus, 
unlike FGT(0) and FGT(1) is sensitive to the distribution of income among the poor. 
The results reported in Graph 13 are largely similar to those of Graph 12. There are 
minimal changes in the indices until 2010. In most cases we see increasingly larger 
rises in relative poverty between 2011 and 2015 and a smaller increase between 
2015 and 2016 (at least for FGT(2) whose value in 2015 increases by more than 
12% as a result of recurrent property taxes - the pattern of the other two is not 
entirely clear). The higher the poverty-aversion parameter of the index, the larger 
the recorded proportional change in relative poverty. Changes in the estimates of the 
poverty indices in 2016 are lower when simulated data are used instead of the origi-
nal SILC data. However, the simulations of EUROMOD suggest that unlike the 
changes recorded in inequality indices for the period 2016-2018, the poverty-
increasing impact of recurrent property taxes rose during this period. For the last 
year under examination the poverty-increasing effect of property taxes declines 
according to FGT(0) and FGT(1) but remains stable according to FGT(2). Never-
theless, it is clear that the reforms in the field of recurrent property taxation in the 
years of the Economic Adjustment Programs increased relative poverty.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The paper aimed to examine the distributional impact of recurrent property taxa-
tion in Greece. Until a few years ago recurrent property taxation played a minimal 
role in the Greek tax system. In the middle of the recent severe crisis, a new 
scheme of recurrent property taxation was introduced, initially covering only 
buildings connected to the electricity grid, but later extended to all types of real 
estate. The new tax had high collectability, boosted public revenues and substan-
tially helped the fiscal stabilization effort of the country. In line with the experi-
ence of several other countries, this tax was also hugely unpopular.
Our results show that the distributional effect of the tax was clearly regressive. 
Although, on average, in absolute terms richer households paid higher recurrent 
property taxes than poorer households, the ratio of the tax to the pre-tax disposable 
income was substantially higher in the case of poorer households. As a consequence, 
ceteris paribus, inequality and (relative) poverty indices rose after the imposition of 
the tax. The result was stronger in the case of inequality indices that are relatively 
more sensitive to changes close to the bottom of the distribution and poverty indices 
that are sensitive to the distribution of income among the poor. Recent policy 
changes proportionately reducing the tax mitigated these effects. However, carefully 
designed tax relief may be needed if the aim is to keep the amount of tax revenues 
collected constant and at the same time neutralize its adverse distributional effects. 
Yet, taking it into account that the “grey economy” is extensive in Greece (Kelman-
son et al., 2019), the link between property taxation and income criteria should be 
tackled with care in order to avoid increasing incentives for tax evasion.
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